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1 Introduction 
A large body of research, first in sociology, then in physics, and more recently in 
economics, has studied the importance of social networks in different activities. Social 
networks are indeed important in several facets of our lives. For example, the decision 
of an agent to whether buy or not a new product, attend a meeting, commit a crime, find 
a job is often influenced by the choices of his or her friends and acquaintances (be they 
social or professional). The emerging empirical evidence on these issues motivates the 
theoretical study of network effects. For example, job offers can be obtained from 
direct, and indirect, acquaintances through word-of-mouth communication. Also, risk-
sharing devices and cooperation usually rely on family and friendship ties. Spread of 
diseases, such as AIDS infection, also strongly depends on the geometry of social 
contacts. If the web of connections is dense, we can expect higher infection rates. 
The study of social networks was indeed initiated by sociologists more than a century 
ago and has grown to be a central field of sociology over the past fifty years (see e.g. 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Over that same period, a mathematical literature on the 
structure and properties of graphs has been developed and extensively studied (see 
Bollobas, 1998; Diestel, 2005). A recent awakening of interest in social networks has 
occurred in the computer science and statistical physics literatures, mainly over the past 
five or six years (see Albert and Barabási, 2002; Newman, 2003, for an overview of 
these studies). While the importance of embeddedness of economic activity in social 
settings has been fundamental to sociologists (and to some extend to applied 
mathematicians) for some time, it was largely ignored by economists until the last 
decade. Indeed, studies of networks with economic perspectives and using game-
theoretic modelling techniques have only emerged over the last decade (see Goyal, 
2007; Vega-Redondo, 2007; Jackson, 2007; 2008). 
A network is an abstract object that models these social interactions. In particular, a 
network is formed by nodes (or vertices) that represent the actors involved, and edges 
(or links) that express the linkage among these nodes. Networks provide a simplified 
geometrical representation of a complex magma of social relationships. However, if 
social interactions represent a first-order driving force for the problem under 
consideration, a detailed study of the characteristics of the network should reveal some 
relevant features of social structure that induce the resulting outcomes. In the job market 
example, it is of paramount importance to know the geometric characteristics of the 
network that induce job market outcomes and how different individuals end up in 
different situations due to their asymmetric positions in the network of personal 
relationships. Isolated individuals, or individuals with low-quality links with the rest of 
the community, have weaker positions in the network and are there more prone to be 
and to stay unemployed for a long period of time since they do not obtain (valuable) job 
information from their contacts.   3
Different fields have, obviously, different approaches. Most sociologists  would 
explain (most) networks as an unintended  outcome of other kinds of activities that 
individuals engage in. Individuals grow up in certain neighborhoods, they attend certain 
schools, they take jobs at certain workplaces, etc., and, as a by-product of this, they get 
friends and acquaintances that become nodes in their networks. Their choice of friends 
and acquaintances rarely is based on their instrumental usefulness. On the contrary, 
economists would explain networks as an intended outcome stemming from strategic 
interactions. As Coleman (1988) puts it:  “There are two broad intellectual streams in 
the description and explanations of social action. One, characteristic of the work of most 
sociologists, sees the actor as socialized and action as governed by social norms, rules, 
and obligations. The principal virtues of this intellectual stream lie in its ability to 
describe action in social context and to explain the way action is shaped, constrained, 
and redirected by the social context. The other intellectual stream, characteristic of the 
work of most economists, sees the actor as having goals independently arrived at, as 
acting independently, as a whole self-interested. Its principal virtue lies in having a 
principle of action, that of maximizing utility. This principle of action, together with a 
single empirical generalization (declining marginal utility) has generated the extensive 
growth of neoclassical economic theory, as well as the growth of political philosophy of 
several varieties: utilitarism, contractarianism, and natural rights.” 
The aim of this chapter is to survey the literature on social networks putting together 
the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their 
similarities and differences. In the next section, we will first present some measures of 
characteristics of social networks, mainly introduced by sociologists, which will be 
useful later on. In Section 3, we will expose and develop the two main ways of 
modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics approach is 
capable of reproducing most observed networks, it does not explain why they emerge. 
On the contrary, the economics approach is very precise in explaining why networks 
emerge but does a poor job in matching real-world networks. Section 4 will analyze 
behaviors on networks, which take as given networks and study the impact of their 
structure on individuals’ outcomes. We will use the game-theoretical framework, 
characteristic of economics, and will compare the results obtained to those in sociology. 
The last section will then conclude.  
 
2 Social  Network  Analysis 
Many techniques and concepts have been developed continuously over the years 
during the last century and there is right now a powerful machinery available under the 
corpus of social network analysis. It is not the aim of this survey to treat with full 
generality all relevant contributions in this field.
1 In particular, in this section, we are 
                                                      
1 See Wasserman and Faust (1996) for an excellent and exhaustive survey of social network analysis.   4
going to focus on a small subset of concepts, a set of centrality measures, that have 
been introduced in the literature to capture in a numerical form the prominence of actors 
inside a network.  
Centrality measures aim at ranking individuals in terms of their relevance due to their 
position in the network. Social network analysis also introduces other characteristics of 
social structure such as the concept of structural equivalence (Lorrain and White, 1971) 
and blockmodelling techniques (White, Boorman and Breiger, 1976). The concept of 
structural equivalence tries to uncover similar roles and social positions shared by 
different actors in a network. The hypothesis behind structural equivalence is that actors 
who share a similar position inside a network are going to end up with similar 
outcomes. On the other hand, blockmodelling techniques aim at disentangling different 
roles in a network when considering social network data.   
For convenience, in this section, we are going to interpret links as communication 
lines. This unifies the treatment and interpretation but has no technical implication on 
the concepts defined.  
There are several ways of constructing numerical statistics that can give a measure of 
the relevance of an individual embedded in a complex web of social relationships. The 
simplest and a most natural way are simply to count the number of connections an agent 
has. This measure is called degree centrality. Under degree centrality, agents who have 
a higher degree enjoy a better position inside the network. This measure is associated to 
the idea that “the more connections one has, the better it is”. For example, more 
connected individuals can have access to more information sources that can translate 
into better socioeconomic outcomes.  
While degree distribution seems an appealing concept, it is only considering direct 
benefits derived from connections, abstracting from the potential contribution of 
indirect benefits derived from indirect connections. In that respect, degree centrality can 
be quite misleading in some situations.  
Granovetter (1973, 1983)’s seminal work extends this concept by distinguishing 
between strong and weak ties.
2 This taxonomy of social interactions determines 
different functions of different kinds of connections. Granovetter’s thesis is that the 
strength of a tie among two different actors is proportional to the level of overlapping of 
their local social capital. Indeed, in a close network, everyone knows each other, 
information is shared and so potential sources of information are quickly shaken down, 
the network quickly becomes redundant in terms of access to new information. In 
contrast, Granovetter stresses the strength of weak ties involving a secondary ring of 
acquaintances who have contacts with networks outside ego’s network and therefore 
offer new sources of information on job opportunities. As Granovetter (1973) claims 
“whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater 
                                                      
2 Roughly speaking weak ties are indirect links such as acquaintances while strong ties are direct links  such as close 
friends or family.   5
social distance (…), when passed through weak ties rather than strong ties” (p. 1366). In 
substance, weak ties foster widespread diffusion, while strong ties breed local sharing.  
If as Granovetter suggests, increasing the number of informational sources can have 
some impact on outcomes, then direct links can be of different qualities depending on 
whether they are providing access to new secondary sources of information or not. 
Aggregating in the same way all kind of connections irrespectively of its strength, as 
degree centrality does, can be quite misleading as a measure of influence and power 
inside the network. To understand this, let us look at clustering coefficients. An agent 
has a high level of clustering if most of the friends of his/her friends are also his/her 
friends. If this is the case, the local ego-centered network of an individual is weaker 
than that of another agent with the same number of connections but with a smaller 
clustering. This effect is, precisely, the redundancy of information associated to strong 
ties stressed by Granovetter.  
It is in fact possible to incorporate indirect connections in a centrality measure in 
several ways. When considering direct and indirect benefits, it is natural to assume that 
the benefits of any connection dilute with the distance between agents involved in it. It 
is indeed not the same to receive information immediately from a direct connection (i.e. 
a close friend) and indirectly from individuals located several links away. The quality of 
information decays with distance. As a result, it seems quite natural to construct the 
following centrality measure. Give to any individual a particular numerical value for 
each of his/her direct connection. Then, give a smaller value to any connection at 
distance two and an even smaller value to any connection at distance three; etc.
3 When 
adding up all these values, we end up with a new numerical value that is now capturing 
both direct and indirect connections of any order. This is the idea behind Katz (1953) 
and Bonacich (1987) network centrality measure.
4 This in not at all an ad-hoc 
construction. It arises naturally in dynamic settings of social influence (Friedkin, 1991) 
or, as we will see below, as the equilibrium outcome of games with network 
complementarities (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2006).  
The degree and Katz-Bonacich centrality measures capture the power and influence 
of individuals as recipients of information. Although this can be the natural way to 
introduce power in a number of situations, there are other settings in which the power of 
an individual is induced by his/her position as an intermediate in the communication 
process. When an agent is relevant for most communication processes inside the 
network, he/she can exert an important role since he/she can deter or even prevent 
information transmission. Betweenness centrality, introduced by Freeman (1977; 1979), 
                                                      
3 A simple way to construct these values is through a discount factor  1 0 < <δ . If a direct connection has value α , 
any indirect connection of order two then has a value equals to  α δα < , an indirect connection of order three has a 
value of  δα α δ < 2 , and so on. 
4 These centrality measures are closely related to the so-called eigenvector centrality measures (see Bonacich and 
Lloyd, 2001) that lie at the core of ranking methods (see, for example, Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004), like 
Google’s PageRank algorithm, or on recently developed segregation measures based on social interactions 
(Echenique and Fryer, 2007).   6
measures precisely this source of influence inside the network. Essentially, betweenness 
centrality calculates the relative number of indirect connections (or paths) in which the 
actor into consideration is involved in with respect to the total number of paths in the 
network.  This strongly relates to the concept of structural holes due to Burt (1992). 
Holes in social structure emerge in situations in which there is a lack of connections 
between different subgroups. Burt claims that agents who bridge these structural holes 
can extract a disproportionate benefit compared to other individuals who share a similar 
social position but who are not linking holes. Betweenness centrality provides a 
mathematical way to characterize agents that are bridging structural holes.   
To illustrate the concepts presented in this section, consider the following network. 
           
                         
 
In this network, the agent represented by a white circle is less relevant when 
considering degree centrality. He/she has a degree equals to two, while the rest of agents 
have a degree at least equals to 3.  Instead, we can ensure that this same agent is the 
more central one when considering betweenness centrality. He/she is in a bottleneck 
position inside the network. All communication from one side to the other side of the 
network necessarily has to pass through him/her, and, if controlling information is 
important, he/she can extract large positive benefits. He/she is bridging a structural hole. 
If we now consider the Bonacich centrality measure, this individual can either be the 
less or the more central agent inside the network depending on the value of the discount 
factor. For small discount factors (i.e. indirect links give less benefits), the agent is the 
less central one while for high levels of discount (i.e. direct links are weighted less), this 
agent is the most central. 
Hence, the three centrality measures rank agents differently. The adequacy of one 
measure over the other very much depends on the context and interpretation given to the 
network. 
 
3 Network  Formation 
One of the main goals of the analysis of social networks is to shed some light on the 
mechanisms explaining how and why networks form. If social networks are relevant, 
we need to understand how networks emerge and the forces determining their shape. 
One possible reason why a link is formed is pure chance. Two individuals randomly 
meet and create a link between them, which can represent friendship or a stable working   7
relationship. A set of different models have arisen based on this assumption. They are 
called random models of network formation.   
Another possible reason for the formation of a link is strategic interactions. 
Individuals carefully decide with whom to interact and this decision entails some 
consent by both parts in a given relationship. Strategic network formation models are, 
precisely, grounded on this premise.  
We now discuss with some detail both domains of research. 
 
3.1  Random models of network formation 
 
The simplest useful model of a random network (and one of the oldest) is the 
Bernoulli random graph, often just called the random graph for short (Solomonoff and 
Rapoport, 1951; Erdős and Rényi, 1959, 1960; Bollobás, 2001). In this model, a certain 
number of vertices (or nodes) are taken and edges (or links) are created between them 
with independent probability p for each vertex pair. When p is small, there are only a 
few edges in the network and most vertices exist in isolation or in small groups of 
connected vertices. Conversely, for large p, almost every possible edge is present 
between the possible vertex pairs and all or almost all of the vertices join together in a 
single large connected group called a giant component.  
Understanding when a network is going to be fully connected is important, for 
example, to characterize the possible dynamics of infection rates in a population. There 
are, in fact, several common characteristics shared by most social networks. While the 
random graph model illuminates our understanding about when a giant component 
emerges, it cannot correctly mimic other critical aspects of real-world networks. The 
recent physics/applied mathematics literature have proposed different models that solve 
this weaknesses of the Erdös-Rény framework.  
One of the main characteristics most networks have is that their degree distribution 
(i.e. the number of links each node has) is scale-free,
5 which in a mathematical form 
means that it follows a power law.
6 A power law implies that the probability that an 
agent is intensively connected to other agents in the society is non-negligible and 
strictly above zero. In particular, if a network is scale-free, we should expect that a 
small number of agents in the network show a high number of connections compared to 
the majority of agents who are involved in a small number of connections.  
We can find empirical evidence on this pattern when analyzing for example the 
pattern of adult human sexual contacts. Liljeros et al. (2001) study the 1996 Swedish 
survey of sexual behavior and provide neat evidence that the distribution of sexual 
                                                      
5 Of course, this is not a property of universal compliance in all kind of networks. There is empirical evidence against 
it (see, for example, the work of Amaral et al., 2000, on three different examples of social networks) and also some 
literature that partially corroborates this rule, with some inconsistency in the tails of the distribution (see Newman, 
2001, for an example of a network that satisfies a kind of perturbed power law distribution when considering 
scientific collaborations).  
6 A power law is any polynomial relationship that exhibits the property of scale invariance.   8
partners follows a power law distribution, hence, validating the scale-free hypothesis. 
The following figure, taken from Liljeros et al. (2001), plots the cumulative distribution 
of sexual connectivity: 
              
 
  More precisely, Figure 2a shows that, for male and female respondents, the 
cumulative distribution of the number of sex partners over a period of 12 months before 
the survey while Figure 2b displays the same statistics for a much longer period, namely 
for the respondent’s life up to the time of the survey. It is easy to see that, in both 
figures, the data closely follow a straight line in a double-logarithmic plot, which is 
consistent with a power-law dependence and the fact that the degree distribution has fat 
tails. This means, in particular, that most of the people in the sample had very few 
sexual partners while a small group had a very high number of sexual partners over their 
lifetime (up to 600 for the most “active” ones!). Other networks such as the World 
World Web, the movie actor collaboration, or linkage due to scientific co-authorship 
(Albert and Barabási, 2002; Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2006) also 
display the same properties of scale-free networks and power laws. 
It is interesting to compare the results of Liljeros et al. (2001) to that of Bearman, 
Moody and Stovel (2004). The latter is a thorough analysis of the structure of an 
adolescent romantic and sexual network in a population of over 800 adolescents 
residing in a midsized town in the midwestern United States.
7 The authors analyze 
                                                      
7 Data are drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).   9
reports of relationships of this adolescent network that occurred over a period of 18 
months between 1993 and 1995. Interestingly, they find that the geometry of this 
network of adolescent sexual contacts is quite different from that of Liljeros et al. Most 
of its young members are included in a single giant component, which means that either 
directly or indirectly they are all connected to the majority of the students in the high-
school. This, in particular, implies that the structure of this network looks very much 
like what the Erdös-Rény model predicts: the degree distribution of each adolescent 
follows rather a gaussian (normal) distribution than a power law. These striking 
differences lead to distinct policy implications when trying to combat, for example, the 
spread of diseases related to sexual contacts. For adults, as suggested by Liljeros et al. 
(2001), it might be more productive to focus all efforts into targeting individuals in the 
upper tail of the degree distribution, i.e. the small number of people that have a high 
number of sexual contacts. This targeting would ensure that those nodes from which 
spread and contagion can be more harmful are controlled for or at least stimulated to 
take preventive measures. However, because of the results of Bearman, Moody and 
Stovel (2004), for adolescents, given that they are all essentially on equal footing within 
the network, a policy based on widespread education on healthy habits may be much 
more efficient.  
The Erdös-Rény model cannot rationalize scale-free degree distributions. In 
particular, it predicts that the probability that an individual has a large number of 
connections goes to zero as this number of connections increases. Barabási and Albert 
(1999) propose a model which is able to reproduce the scale-free nature of degree 
distributions and explain the fat-tailed degree distributions observed in some networks 
(like the sexual contact network described above). In the Barabási-Albert model, the 
population is increasing over time and agents show preferential attachment, meaning 
that new agents in the network are more likely to connect to agents that are already 
well-connected. The authors show that the preferential attachment mechanism naturally 
induces the emergence of a power-law degree distribution. Although, other alternative 
mechanisms have been considered in both the theoretical and empirical literatures, 
preferential attachment has been frequently invoked as a probable source of scale-free 
properties in self-organization of social, and other types of, networks.  
Unfortunately, while the preferential-attachment model does a good job in trying to 
fit the empirical evidence on the scale free nature of connectivity, it does not satisfy 
another widespread characteristic of many real-world networks: the small-world 
property.
8 A possible interpretation of this property is that agents in a network tend to 
                                                      
8 A network that displays small-world properties has the characteristic that most nodes can be reached from every 
other by a small number of steps. More precisely, a network displays a small-world property if the mean geodesic 
distance between vertex pairs (the geodesic distance between two vertices is the length of any shortest path between 
them) is small compared with the size of the network as a whole (often measured by its diameter, which is the length 
of the largest geodesic distance between any pair of vertices in the network). In a famous experiment conducted in the 
1960s, the psychologist Stanley Milgram (1967) asked participants (located in the United States) to get a message to a 
   10
show similar levels of connectivity and a high level of clustering (i.e. if John is friend 
with Patricia and if Patricia is friend with Patrick, then a high level of clustering means 
that John and Patrick are, most probably, also friends), and furthermore that the 
diameter of the network is quite small.  
Watts and Strogatz (1998) provide a model that incorporates elements of both social 
structure and randomness to obtain networks that have the small-world properties. In 
this model, the “social structure” is represented by a uniform one-dimensional lattice 
(the circle), where each node is connected to its k nearest neighbors on the lattice, and 
“randomness” is characterized by a tunable parameter p, which specified the probability 
that a link in the lattice would be randomly rewired (see the figure below). To be more 
precise, start with a strongly regular network in which nodes are located in a circular 
network and are also connected to the neighbors of their neighbors (in the panel at the 
extreme left of the figure, each node is connected to its two direct neighbors and to its 
two neighbors of length 2). Then, take randomly some of the existing links, just a small 
number of them, and rewire them across the network. This rewiring process leads to a 
new geometrical arrangement where the clustering level is still high, due to the initial 
topology of connections, and where the value of the diameter is reducing due to the 
rewiring process which randomly connects distant agents in the initial network.  The 
following picture, taken from Watts and Strogatz’s work, provides a graphical intuition 
of the consequences of the rewiring mechanism: 
                         
                            
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
specified target person elsewhere in the country by passing it from one acquaintance to another, stepwise through the 
population. Milgram’s remarkable finding that the typical message passed though just six people on its journey 
between (roughly) randomly chosen. The research was groundbreaking in that it suggested that human society is a 
small world type network characterized by short path lengths. The experiments are often associated with the phrase 
“six degrees of separation”, although Milgram did not use this term himself.   11
The process starts with the network at the left of the picture. If no kind of rewiring and 
randomness are introduced, then the same regular network is sustained. When the level 
of rewiring/randomness starts to increase, we evolve to a situation in which only a small 
number of links are rearranged, leading to a characteristic small-world pattern, 
represented at the center of the picture. If there is too much rewiring/randomness (p 
close to 1), then, as can be seen from the right panel of the figure, the process turns back 
to a purely random process à la Erdös-Rény. However, because of the mechanism that 
governs this network formation process, Watts and Strogatz (1998) are not able to 
obtain the scale free degree distribution property.   
A recent paper by Jackson and Rogers (2007) overcomes this last problem by 
providing an hybrid model that has most of the properties shared by real-world 
networks, i.e. low diameter, high clustering, small-world and scale-free properties. In 
this paper, Jackson and Rogers (2007) combine the pure random model of Erdös-Rény 
with the preferential attachment model of Barabási and Albert (1999). More precisely, 
they develop a dynamic model of network formation where nodes find other nodes with 
whom they form links with in two ways: some are found uniformly at random (as in the 
Erdös-Rény model) while others are found by searching locally through the current 
structure of the network, e.g. meeting friends of friends (i.e. preferential attachment).   
The authors then use their model to calibrate it with data from widely varied 
applications, in particular, the network of romantic relationships among high-school 
students exposed above (Bearman, Moody, and Stovel, 2004). They also find that the 
high-school romance networks are almost uniformly random. Interestingly, clustering is 
absent since the high-school romance network is predominately a heterosexual 
(bipartite) network.  
 
 
3.2 Strategic  network  formation 
 
We would like now to expose the economic approach of network formation where 
links are not formed at random or in a rather mechanical way (as in the preferential 
attachment model), but by a process for which agents form links that maximize their 
own well-being. Indeed, the main advantages of random graph models are that: (i) they 
generate large networks with well identified properties; (ii) they mimic real networks (at 
least in some characteristics); (iii) they tie a specific property to a specific process. 
However, as pointed out by Jackson (2007), they are unable to answer the why behind 
network formation. For example, in Watts and Strogatz (1998), the “social structure” is 
represented by a uniform one-dimensional lattice. This is an assumption and we do not 
know why and under which condition this network structure prevails. Similarly, 
Barabási and Albert (1999) never justify why agents behave according to the 
preferential attachment rule. On the contrary, by focussing on the optimal behavior of 
agents in making links, we can understand why certain network structures emerge. The   12
economics approach also has its limits since it is unable to derive “equilibrium” 
networks that have the properties of most real-world networks and, in particular, cannot 
tell which degree distribution should emerge.  
The strategic component in network formation models relies on the fact that the 
utility function
9 of an agent depends on the activity undertaken by the rest of the agents 
with whom he/she is linked to.  Hence, agents have to choose with whom they would 
like to form a link. At the same time other agents are considering the same kind of 
decision. Altogether, this specifies a game. 
Game theory provides a set of rigorous and powerful tools to analyze such a situation 
(see e.g. Myerson, 1991). Strategic network formation analysis borrows from this 
literature and has also contributed to its recent enlargement. Nash equilibrium is the key 
concept in game theory.
10 
Myerson (1977; 1991) provides an early formulation of a network formation game. 
The structure of the game is simple: agents have to decide about their potential partners 
and their strategies consist in naming those with whom they want to form a link with. 
For a link to be formed, it has to be that two individuals name each other, i.e. there 
needs to be mutual consent in link creation. The Nash equilibrium concept can then be 
used to find out which strategy profiles are stable and, hence, which networks are the 
possible outcomes of the game.  
The main problem of using the Nash equilibrium concept is that it exacerbates the 
coordination problems that arise when all agents are simultaneously deciding about 
friendship ties. In particular, the empty network (i.e. nobody forms a link) is always a 
Nash equilibrium of this game since no deviation is profitable. Indeed, deviating means 
here to name someone as a friend but this will not generate a link because of mutual 
consent. In general, with the Myerson game, there are many equilibria, which reduces 
the attractiveness of this approach. 
A first solution to this problem has been proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). 
In their seminal paper, they introduce an alternative solution concept for network 
formation games, namely pairwise stability. To be pairwise stable, a network has to 
satisfy two conditions. First, no agent has incentives to severe any of the existing links, 
and, second, no pair of agents have incentives to create a non-existing link among them.  
Pairwise stability is a relatively weak solution concept that captures the essence of 
mutual consent. It still has limited prediction power, but introduces in network 
formation models the tendency to form mutually beneficial links and severing links that 
are counterproductive for at least one of the two parts of the relationship. 
                                                      
9 A utility function is a mathematical expression that assigns real numbers (utils) to all possible choices. 
10 Indeed, in game theory, the Nash equilibrium (named after John F. Nash) is a solution concept of a game 
involving two or more players, in which no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy (i.e., 
by changing unilaterally). If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her 
strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices constitute a Nash 
equilibrium.  
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A second alternative to the Myerson game is to consider directed instead of 
undirected networks,
11 which solves the coordination problem of mutual consent. Bala 
and Goyal (2000) extend the Myerson model described above by only considering 
directed networks, i.e. individuals form links unilaterally without requiring the consent 
of the other party to create a link. 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also introduce the so-called connections model, which 
uses a simple linear utility function aiming at capturing the usefulness of direct and 
indirect connections to gain access to a number of different resources (such as, for 
example, information on job openings) and the costs of establishing these connections. 
In particular, any connection, direct or indirect, is valuable, although more distant 
connections contribute less to an agent’s well-being. Only direct links are, however, 
costly. Agents have to consider the costs and benefits of creating new links in a 
decentralized manner and, as a result, the set of possible outcomes can be characterized. 
Several network typologies can be pairwise-stable and, quite naturally, the set of 
possible outcomes depends on the costs and benefits of forming a link.   
One of the main virtues of using pairwise stability as a solution concept for network 
formation games is that it is relatively easy to check when a network is pairwise stable 
or not. For example, consider the following star network, with a center (agent 1) 
connected to three peripheral agents (agents 2, 3, and 4). 








In the connections model, connectivity rewards are computed through a discount 
factor  1 0 < <δ . A direct connection provides a reward equals toδ ; a friend of friend 
gives  2 δ ; a link with an indirect friend of length k gives k δ ; and so forth. Only the cost 
of forming direct friendships is considered and is denoted by  0 > c . For the sake of 
exposition, let us consider the case in which  5 . 0 = δ  and 6 . 0 = c . We can then see that 
the star network depicted above is not pairwise stable because the central agent (agent 
1) would improve his/her utility by cutting any of his/her existing links with agents 2, 3, 
and 4. Indeed, the reward of any of such connections is 0.5 while the cost is 0.6. This 
                                                      
11 A network is undirected if links are reciprocal, that is if i is linked to j, then it has to be that j is linked to i.  On the 
contrary, a network is directed if links are not reciprocal. In the latter case, a link has two distinct ends: a head (the 
end with an arrow) and a tail. Each end is counted separately. The sum of head endpoints count toward the indegree 
and the sum of tail endpoints count toward the outdegree. Friendships are usually modelled using undirected 
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generates a disutility of  1 . 0 − . Therefore, for this particular parametric setup, given that 
the center has incentives to severe some of his/her existing links in the network, this star 
network is not pairwise stable. 
Besides this pure positive analysis, a utilitarian perspective is introduced to conduct a 
normative analysis, trying to evaluate which networks are socially optimal. The 
tractability of the “connection model” offers a first reasonable benchmark to gain 
insight on this issue.  Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provide a characterization of the set 
of all efficient networks.
12 It is shown that the set of efficient networks usually does not 
equal, or only partially include, the set of pairwise stable networks.
13  
For example, coming back to the star network described above, it can be proved that 
this network is socially efficient when δ =0.5 and c =0.6, while we have seen that it 
was not pairwise stable. Indeed, the central agent 1 is paying for three different 
connections, while the peripheral agents (2, 3, and 4) only pay for one, but they all 
benefit from indirect connections due to their direct link to the center (peripheral agents 
are all at a distance 2 from each other). It is the positive spreading of externalities from 
indirect neighbors that makes the star network efficient. However, this network is not 
pairwise stable because the cost the central agent is paying is too large compared to the 
benefit of maintaining links with peripheral agents. In that case, decentralized behavior 
cannot induce a socially optimal geometry of connections.  
This analysis reveals that, in general, individual and social incentives are not 
compatible, and that decentralized behavior usually results in an inefficient arrangement 
of social ties.   
This last result is particularly remarkable. This tension between individual incentives 
and social welfare leads quite naturally to the following question: is there any way this 
tension can be weakened? In other words, can we find welfare-enhancing policies that 
ensure that the resulting network of relationships is optimal, or closer to an optimum, 
for the society as a whole? For example, it is clear that identity issues shape friendship 
formation during childhood and adolescence (see, for example, Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; De Martí and Zenou, 2009). The assignment of students to classrooms can be 
then considered as a potential policy tool that impacts on the outcome of friendship 
formation mechanisms in school and schooling outcomes. Strategic network formation 
models can thus shed some light on these kinds of debates, in particular, in situations 
where individual decisions are driven by both private interests and social forces that can 
be incorporated into a utility function.   
 
                                                      
12 Even if a utilitarian approach is considered valid, this is not necessarily the adequate one. We skip this debate here, 
and refer the interested reader to Moulin (2003) and other chapters in this Handbook. 
13 See also Bala and Goyal (2000) for an analysis of the connections model in directed networks.    15
4  Behavior on networks  
In this section, we would like to take the network as given and study how its 
structure impacts on outcomes and individual decisions.  
The theory of “games on networks” aims at determining the outcome of a game with 
n players or agents (that can be individuals, firms, regions, countries, etc.) who are all 
linked (directly or indirectly) together in a network and are choosing an action (that 
could be search effort, job market decisions, engagement in criminal activities, 
investment in R&D, etc.) that maximizes their utility. What is interesting in these games 
is that agents are utility maximizers that take into account the interdependencies 
generated by the social network structure. Social capital is incorporated in the utility 
function of each actor. 
Most of this rather small and new literature has focused on static models (only what 
happens today prevails so that there is no time dimension) with perfect information, i.e. 
all agents perfectly know the structure of the network and the actions taken, not only by 
their direct friends, but by all agents in the network. Even so, both premises can be 
relaxed to accommodate more realistic assumptions. For example, Galeotti et al. (2009) 
develop a general model of games played on networks, in which players have private 
and incomplete information about the network.
14 In this paper, agents do not know the 
whole network but are informed only of their own degree (i.e. number of links). 
Moreover, they assume that agents have beliefs about the rest of the network that 
depend on their own degree, which are summarized by a probability distribution over 
the degrees of their neighbors.  
 
4.1  A Networked Model of Peer Effects 
 
Consider an individual connected by a network of peer influences. In this network 
each agent reaps complementarities
15 from all his/her direct network peers. Ballester, 
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) compute the Nash equilibrium of this peer effect 
game when agents choose their peer effort simultaneously. In their setup, restricted to 
linear-quadratic utility functions, they establish that the peer effects game described 
above has a unique Nash equilibrium
16 where each agent strategy is proportional to 
his/her Katz-Bonacich centrality measure, already introduced in Section 2. This is the 
                                                      
14 There are other studies of games with incomplete network knowledge in economics (see, in particular, Galeotti and 
Vega-Redondo, 2005; Sundararajan, 2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2007).  
15 The efforts of two or more agents are called strategic complements if they mutually reinforce one another. For 
example, in a crime context, the effort decisions are strategic complements if an increase in the crime effort of one 
individual increases the marginal utility of the others, because, in that case, the others will have an incentive to 
provide more crime effort too. 
16 Under the condition that network complementarities are smaller than the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the 
graph (i.e. network).   16
main theoretical result of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006), a good example 
of how the economic and sociological literature on networks can fruitfully borrow from 
each other. At equilibrium, individual decisions emanate from all the existing network 
chains of direct and indirect contacts stemming from each node, which is a feature 
characteristic of Katz-Bonacich centrality.  
Consider for example the following network: 
 
This network results from the overlap between two different dyads (dyad of agents 1 
and 2 and dyad of agents 1 and 3) with a common partner, agent 1. Agent 2 reaps direct 
complementarities from agent 1 in one dyad whom, in turn, reaps direct 
complementarities from agents 2 and 3 in both dyads. Thus, through the interaction with 
the central agent, peripheral agents end up reaping complementarities indirectly from 
each other. For this reason, the equilibrium decisions in each dyad cannot be analyzed 
independently of each other. Rather, each dyad exerts a strategic externality on the other 
one, and the equilibrium effort level of each agent reflects this externality. 
What kinds of predictions can we learn from this model? Let us think of crime. It is 
well-established that crime is, to some extent, a group phenomenon, and the source of 
crime and delinquency is located in the intimate social networks of individuals (see e.g. 
Sutherland, 1947, Sarnecki, 2001 and Warr, 2002). Indeed, criminals often have friends 
who have themselves committed several offences, and social ties among criminals are 
seen as a means whereby individuals exert an influence over one another to commit 
crimes. In fact, not only friends but also the structure of social networks matters in 
explaining individuals’ own criminal behavior.
17  
The model presented above predicts that a key determinant of one’s criminal 
activities is the position in the network, i.e. the more central (in terms of Katz-Bonacich 
centrality index) is a person in a network, the higher is his/her level of criminal activity. 
In other words, it gives a causal relationship between network’s location and criminal 
activities.
18, 19 
                                                      
17 See Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) who model criminal activity through imitation in stylized social 
networks, and Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) for an economic model of externalities in crime and social 
networks. For recent empirical studies on crime and social interactions, see, in particular, Patacchini and Zenou 
(2008), Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2009), Patacchini and Zenou (2010). 
18 The main obstacle to empirically identifying peer and social network effects is what Manski (1993) termed the 
reflection problem: absent further assumptions on the nature of peer influence, it is impossible to distinguish the 
causal impact of peers’ behavior on an individual’s behavior from the causal impact of peers’ background 
characteristics on an individual’s behavior.  Manski refers to this type of causal influence as an exogenous social 
effect. It is also difficult to distinguish between peers’ behavior and individual’s behavior, independent of any other 
individual, peer, or contextual factors. This is referred to as an endogenous social effect. Consider, for example, a 
child’s decision to initiate drug use. Is it because his/her next-door neighbor decided to initiate drug use (endogenous 
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But, in fact, the model can predict even more. It can propose new policies aiming at 
reducing crime. Indeed, in the standard economic literature on crime, where criminals 
decide to commit crime based on a cost-benefit analysis (see, for instance, the literature 
surveys by Garoupa, 1997, and Polinsky and Shavell, 2000), the standard policy tool to 
reduce aggregate crime relies on the deterrence effects of punishment, i.e., the planner 
should increase uniformly punishment costs.  
The model above, though, associates a distribution of delinquency efforts to the 
network connecting them. In particular, the variance of delinquency efforts reflects the 
variance of network centralities. In this case, a targeted policy that discriminates among 
delinquents depending on their relative network location, and removes a few suitably 
selected targets from this network, alters the whole distribution of delinquency efforts, 
not just shifting it. In practice, the planner may want to identify optimal network targets 
to concentrate (scarce) investigatory resources on some particular individuals, or to 
isolate them from the rest of the group, either through leniency programs, social 
assistance programs, or incarceration. 
This type of discriminating policy has been studied in detail by Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol and Zenou (2006, 2010).  To characterize the network optimal targets, they 
propose a new measure of network centrality, the so-called optimal inter-centrality 
measure, which does not exist in the social network literature. This measure solves the 
planner’s problem that consists in finding and getting rid of the key player, i.e., the 
criminal who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate crime reduction. They show 
that the key player is, precisely, the individual with the highest optimal inter-centrality 
in the network. 
The ranking of criminals according to their individual optimal inter-centrality 
measures, relevant for the selection of the optimal network target, needs not always to 
coincide with the ranking induced by individual equilibrium-Katz-Bonacich centralities. 
In other words, the key player is not necessarily the most active criminal. Indeed, 
removing a criminal from a network has both a direct and an indirect effect. First, fewer 
criminals contribute to the aggregate crime level. This is the direct effect. Second, the 
                                                                                                                                                            
caused both children to adopt the same behavior (exogenous social effect)? The distinction between these 
explanations is important for policy purposes. When true contagion effects operate, intervening to alter one child’s 
behavior may have the net effect of changing several children’s behavior.  In other cases, such as when children 
initiate substance use because adults in their neighborhood provide opportunities to do so, these so-called multiplier 
effects do not exist (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Correctly distinguishing endogenous from exogenous social effects is 
necessary for any effort to gauge the true net impact or social benefits of any behavioral intervention. Bramoullé, 
Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) show how the simple existence of some asymmetry in a peer network can be a sufficient 
condition to ensure that endogenous and exogenous peer effects can be effectively identified. A nice literature survey 
on the empirics of social interactions can be found in Durlauf and Ioannides (2010). 
19 Haynie (2001) tests the impact of the Bonacich centrality on delinquent behaviors using the AddHealth data (these 
data were already used by Bearman, Moody, and Stovel, 2004). Fixing arbitrarily the discount factor to 0.1 for all 
networks, she finds a positive and significant relationship. Using a more structural approach by estimating rather than 
fixing the discount factor (so that different networks have different discount factors), Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini 
and Zenou (2005, 2009) test the same relationship. They show that, after controlling for observable individual 
characteristics and unobservable network specific factors, a standard deviation increase in the Katz-Bonacich 
centrality increases the level of individual delinquency by 44% of one standard deviation.   18
network topology is modified, and the remaining criminals adopt different crime efforts. 
This is the indirect effect. The key player is the one with the highest overall effect. 
To illustrate this result, consider the following network of 11 criminals: 
 
 
We can distinguish three different types of equivalent criminals in this network, 
which are the following: 
 
We can identify the key player in this network of criminals.
20 If the choice of the key 
player were solely governed by the direct effect of criminal removal on aggregate 
crime, type-2 criminals would be the natural candidates. Indeed, these are the ones with 
the highest number of direct connections. But the choice of the key player needs also to 
take into account the indirect effect on aggregate crime reduction induced by the 
network restructuring that follows the removal of one criminal from the original 
network. Because of his/her communities’ bridging role, criminal 1 is also a possible 
candidate for the preferred policy target.  
It can be showed that type-2 criminals always display the highest Katz-Bonacich 
centrality measure.
21 These criminals have the highest number of direct connections. 
Besides, they are directly connected to the bridge criminal 1, which gives them access to 
a very wide and diversified span of indirect connections. Altogether, they are the most 
central criminals and thus those who commit most crimes. However, the most active 
                                                      
20 Observe that, from a macro-structural perspective, type-1 and type-3 criminals are identical: they all have four 
direct links, while type-2 criminals have five direct links each. From a micro-structural perspective, though, criminal 
1 plays a critical role by bridging together two closed-knit (fully intraconnected) communities of five criminals each. 
By removing criminal 1, the network is maximally disrupted as these two communities become totally disconnected, 
while by removing any of the type-2 criminals, the resulting network has the lowest aggregate number of network 
links. 
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criminals are not the key players. Indeed, because indirect effects matter a lot, 
eliminating criminal 1 has the highest joint direct and indirect effect on aggregate crime 
reduction. Criminals counter the higher deterrence they face by spreading their know-
how further away in the network and establishing synergies with criminals located in 
distant parts of the social setting. In that case, the optimal targeted policy is the one that 




4.2  Public Good Provision and Innovation Processes 
 
Efforts can also be strategic substitutes
23 when we focus on a network model of 
public goods.
24 Example of public goods abound. When a person plants a garden, 
his/her neighbors benefit. When a jurisdiction institutes a pollution abatement program, 
the benefits also accrue to nearby communities. When individuals innovate—e.g., 
experiment with new technology or generate new information— the results are often 
non-excludable in certain dimensions and thus others may benefit from the innovation. 
For example, in agriculture, one farmer’s experience with a new crop can benefit other 
farmers, and the physical and social geography of the countryside can influence 
experimentation and learning. In industry, it has been long posited that research findings 
spill over to other firms.  
The questions that these types of models seek to answer are the following: How does 
the social structure affect the level and pattern of public good provision? Do people 
exert effort themselves or rely on others? These are similar questions to the previous 
model of section 4.1 but the answers will be different because of the strategic 
substitutability assumption.  
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) develop a model along these lines. People who are 
linked directly or indirectly by a network of relationships desire a public good which is 
costly to produce. Individuals decide how much effort they want to exert to contribute 
to this good. The authors characterize the Nash equilibria of this game. Their analysis 
yields three main insights. First, networks can lead to specialization. Indeed, in any 
network there is a Nash equilibrium where some individuals contribute to the public 
good and others completely free ride (this was not possible in the case of strategic 
complementarities). In many networks, this extreme situation is the only equilibrium 
outcome. In all networks, such patterns are the only stable outcomes. Hence, agents’ 
positions in a network can determine whether or not they contribute to the public good. 
                                                      
22 A policy targeting a group of criminals rather than one criminal can also be implemented. See Ballester, Calvo-
Armengól and Zenou (2010) for details. 
23 Contrary to complementarities, effort decisions are substitutes if an increase in one individual’s effort decreases the 
marginal utility of the others, giving them an incentive to provide less effort. 
24 In economics, a public good is a good that is non-rivaled and non-excludable. This means, respectively, that 
consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce availability of the good for consumption by others; and 
that no one can be effectively excluded from using the good.   20
Second, specialization can have welfare benefits. This outcome arises when contributors 
are linked, collectively, to many people in society. Finally, new links can reduce overall 
welfare. A new link increases access to the new information/public good, but also 
reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when 
there are holes in a network. 
To illustrate some of these results, let us take an example. Consider the two 
following complete networks with four individuals (where the numbers are the effort 
levels provided by each individual): 
 
 
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) show that for complete networks, in any Nash 
equilibrium, the total aggregate effort is 1, and it can be split in any way among the 
agents. For example, as in the left panel, efforts could be equally distributed, so that 
each agent exerts 1/4, or, as in the right panel, one agent could be a specialist and 
provide an effort of 1 whereas all other individuals free ride by providing no effort. If, 




In that case, only specialized profiles are equilibria. There are just two Nash 
equilibria: either the center is a specialist, or the three agents at the periphery are 
specialists. What do we learn from these simple examples? That the structure of the 
network is the main determinants of the equilibria; denser networks can lead to less 
overall experimentation, and effort sharing is not always possible. 
There is a growing field in economics studying innovation and diffusion of 
information, and there are many studies that suggest that social structures affect 
experimentation and spread of information. The present analysis suggests that 
individuals who have active social neighbors should have high benefits but exert little 
effort. Also, individuals who have prominent social positions are expected to bear less 
of the effort costs and instead rely more on others’ efforts. This model indicates the 
importance of strategic and network efforts. For instance, in their study of the adoption 
of pineapple for export in Ghana, Conley and Udry (2001; 2009) find that, for a given 
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farmer, (i) he/she is more likely to change his/her fertilizer use after his/her information 
neighbors who use similar amounts of fertilizer achieve lower than expected profits; (ii) 
he/she increases (decreases) his/her use of fertilizer after his/her information neighbors 
achieve unexpectedly high profits when using more (less) fertilizer than he/she did. 
 
 
4.3  Collective Action, Coordination, and Social Structure 
 
Another important issue of games on networks is collective action. A group of people 
face a collective action problem in that an individual wants to participate only if joined 
by enough other individuals. We can therefore define a threshold for each individual as 
the number of people necessary for him/her to participate. However, a group’s behavior 
can strongly depend on its internal configuration. Hence, when considering collective 
action problems, it is of paramount importance to understand how the arrangement of 
intra-group social ties is going to shape the decisions of their members.  
Granovetter (1978) and Schelling (1978) provide dynamic models to analyze such 
issues, avoiding a clear linkage of outcomes to the social network structure in society. 
In particular, a snowball effect might be generated only if there are initially enough 
activists who are willing to participate, independently of others decisions. Once these 
activists start the process, other agents will joint as far as the number of people who 
have already joined is higher than their thresholds.   
Chwe (1999; 2000) provides an alternative, static, formulation of the rising of such 
processes rooted at the societal network geometry. He studies the internal structure of a 
group and analyzes how network configuration can lead to massive participation or to a 
failure in coordinating individual activity. Arguably, it does not contradict 
Granovetter’s and Schelling’s models but enriches the understanding of how 
coordination might be necessary to join the first snowflakes, which will then generate a 
snowball effect in collective action. 
More precisely, in Chwe’s model, agents in the network have to decide whether or 
not to participate in a common activity. They are only willing to participate in the 
activity if a minimum number of individuals also participate. There is a coordination 
problem since this information is not known in advance. Each person only knows the 
thresholds of his/her neighbors (i.e. direct links) in the social network (“local 
knowledge”). Individuals can communicate to their acquaintances the value of this 
minimum threshold on activists necessary for him/her to join the activity.  The network, 
thus, shapes individual beliefs. To understand the mechanisms of the model, consider 
the two following networks   22
                    
and the situation in which any agent is willing to join the activity if and only if he/she 
knows for sure that two more individuals are going to joint it too.   
In the first network, the circle, all agents share a symmetric situation. Agent 1 knows 
his/her own threshold and the threshold of his/her neighbours in the network, i.e. 
individuals 2 and 4. Since all of them know the threshold of two other members of the 
network, it is immediate that all four agents are going to join the activity. Indeed, the 
three of them know that each one needs two other individuals to decide to join. Since 
this adds up to three, this suffices to confirm their engagement. Common knowledge 
emerges due to the configuration of the network geometry. 
In the second network, the kite, the first three agents share a similar position inside 
the network while agent 4 is isolated with only one connection to agent 2. As in the 
circle, agents 1, 2 and 3 are going to join the activity because their respective thresholds 
are common knowledge to all of them. However, agent 4 is not going to join them. 
He/she knows that agent 2 needs two other agents to engage into the activity, but he/she 
does not know much about agents 1 and 3. Since agent 4 can not exclude the fact that 
agents 1 and 3 need four or more agents to join, he/she is not sure that either 1 or 3 are 
going to engage in the activity. Thus, agent 4 decides not to participate.  
Observe that in both networks, the circle and the kite, there are four agents and four 
links. The different arrangement of these links, which differentiates both situations, are 
responsible for the fact that agent 4 has a different behavior in the two networks.  Of 
course, more links are always going to increase the possibility that common knowledge 
emerges spontaneously.  
 
4.4  Job market outcomes 
 
So far, we have focused on static outcomes of agents who were connected by a 
network of relationships. Let us examine what happens in the long run when the 
network is assumed to be fixed and the same over time. We  present the model by 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) who discuss their framework in terms of the labor   23
market, a natural application of dynamic processes since workers’ employment status 
are not static but change over time.
 25  
The authors study the evolution over time of employment statuses of n workers 
connected by a network of relationships. They are able to determine how the network of 
relationships influences these outcomes. To be more precise, the network starts with 
some agents being employed and others not. Next, information about job openings is 
obtained. In particular, any given individual hears about a job opening with some 
probability. If the individual is unemployed, then he/she will take the job. However, if 
the individual is already employed, then he/she will pass the information along to a 
direct unemployed friend. Furthermore, when an employed worker hears about a job but 
all his/her friends (i.e. direct links) are already employed, then the job is lost for the 
period. It is also assumed that all unemployed neighbors are treated on an equal footing, 
meaning that the employed worker who has the job information does not favor any of 
his/her direct neighbors. 
A network thus summarizes the links of all agents, where a direct link indicates that 
two individuals know each other, and share their knowledge about job information.  
It is shown that, in steady-state, there is a positive correlation in employment status 
between two path-connected workers. This result is not trivial since, in the short run, the 
correlation is negative. Indeed, in a static model, if an employed worker is directly 
linked to two unemployed workers, then if he/she is aware of a job, he/she will share 
this job information with his/her two unemployed friends. These two individuals, who 
are path-connected (path of length two), are thus in competition with each other and 
only one of them (randomly chosen) will obtain the job and be employed while the 
other will remain unemployed. So their employment status will be negatively correlated 
(see Boorman, 1975; Calvó-Armengol, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005).  
 To get the main intuition on why this negative correlation result does not hold in a 
dynamic labor-market model, we focus on the case with three workers with a star-





                                                      
25 Sociologists and labor economists have produced a broad empirical literature on labor market networks. In fact, the 
pervasiveness of social networks and their relative effectiveness varies with the social group considered. For instance, 
Holzer (1987, 1988) documents that among 16-23 year old workers who reported job acceptance, 66 percent use 
informal search channels (30 percent direct application without referral and 36 percent friends/relatives), while only 
11 percent use state agencies and 10 percent newspapers. See also Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan (1980) and 
Granovetter (1995). More recently, Topa (2001) argues that the observed spatial distribution of unemployment in 
Chicago is consistent with a model of local interactions and information spillovers, and may thus be generated by an 
agent's reliance in informal methods of job search such as networks of personal contacts. Similarly, Bayer, Ross, and 
Topa (2008) document that people who live close to each other, defined as being in the same census block, tend to 
work together, that is, in the same census block. For a survey of the literature on social interactions and the labor 
market, see Ioannides and Loury (2004). 
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In this figure, a black node represents an employed worker (individual 1), while 
unemployed workers (2 and 3) are represented by white nodes. In fact, even though in 
the short run, individuals 2 and 3 are “competitors” for the job information that is first 
heard by individual 1, this is not true in the long-run since individual 2 can benefit from 
individual 3’s presence. Indeed, individual 3’s presence helps improve individual 1’s 
employment status. Moreover, when individual 3 is employed, individual 2 is more 
likely to hear about any job that individual 1 hears about. These aspects of the problem 
counter the local (conditional) negative correlation and help induce a positive 
correlation between the employment status of individuals 2 and 3. 
To illustrate the fact that not only the network is of importance but also its structure, 
let us consider a network with four workers, i.e. n = 4. The following table depicts the 
value of unemployment probabilities of worker 2, and the correlations between workers 
1 and 2, and between workers 1 and 3, in the long-run steady state. These results are 
calculated using numerical simulations repeated for a sufficiently long period of time.  
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First, when there is no social network so that no information is exchanged between 
workers, the unemployment rate of each agent is just equal to its steady-state value. 
Thus, the probability of being unemployed for each worker is 13.2 percent, given that 
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they cannot rely on other workers to get information about jobs and the only chance 
they can have of obtaining a job is by direct methods. Imagine now that only one link is 
added in this network so that workers 1 and 2 are directly linked to each other. Steady-
state unemployment decreases substantially for workers 1 and 2, from 13.2 percent to 
8.3 percent. When more links are added, the unemployment rate for each worker 
decreases even more from 13.2 percent when there are no links to 5 percent when the 
social network is complete. This table also shows the positive correlation between 
employment statuses of different workers already mentioned before.  
This model provides a rationale, for example, of why ethnic minorities, who tend to 
have friends who are of the same ethnicity, have difficulties in finding a job. Since 
employment statuses between direct and indirect friends of the same network are 
correlated, then, like a disease, unemployment will spread among all individuals 
belonging to this network. Indeed, if at the beginning some individuals do not obtain a 
job (say because they are discriminated against), then they cannot help their friends to 
obtain a job, who themselves cannot help their own friends to obtain a job, etc.  
This model is consistent with what research in sociology has found. First, its 
implications are similar to those from the homophily literature i.e., that links between 
similar people typically occur at a much higher rate than among dissimilar people (see 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001, who provide an extensive review of this 
literature in sociology).
26 Furthermore, the result above that employment statuses 
between path-connected friends (i.e. weak ties) are correlated is consistent with 
Grannovetter’s claim that weak ties are extremely important to provide information 
about jobs.
27  
The model goes even further in that it can give interesting policy predictions. As we 
have seen, ex ante identical individuals connected through a network can end up with 
very different outcomes. This ex post heterogeneity is mainly due to differences in 
geometry across local ego-centred networks. As a result, public policy needs to be 
tailored to the explicit role of the network. In particular, the planner can alter the 
allocation of network externalities across individuals and implement optimal 
redistributive schemes by suitably manipulating the network locally. Interventions to 
improve and sustain the employment status of a given agent also improve the outlook 
for the social acquaintances of the agents targeted by the intervention –a contagion 
effect in reverse. In a networked society, education subsidies and other labor market 
regulation policies display local increasing returns for the social topology. Targeted 
interventions magnify the initial effect of the policy, and the more so, the more the 
subsidies and programs are circumscribed to tightly clustered agents in a network. For 
this reason, targeting is more efficient than spreading resources more broadly, and the 
                                                      
26 See also the recent paper by Currarini, Pin and Jackson (2009). 
27 Interestingly, Patacchini and Zenou (2008) also find that weak ties matter in transmitting information about crime 
in adolescent networks.   26
more concentrated the interventions, the higher the efficiency gains. This is similar to 
the targeted policies on crime (i.e. the key player policy) highlighted in Section 4.1. 
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
As we have seen, there are varied ways of approaching social networks. Our aim has 
not been here to cover exhaustively all possible contributions to this literature. Instead, 
we have tried to single out some of the representative works in each of the fields 
interested in understanding the shape and role of social networks. By doing so, we could 
pinpoint the main virtues of each approach and analyze how they can benefit from each 
other.  
Some of the research presented in this chapter already merge concepts and 
techniques from different fields. For example, economists and physicists alike are 
increasingly being aware that sociologists have provided over the years a rich set of 
tools analyzing the structure of social networks, which can be adopted in their 
modelling choices. Economists have contributed to the literature by enriching the 
behavior of actors inside the network. Utilitarianism has proved effective in 
incorporating individual incentives and social preferences that are, arguably, at the core 
of social network formation when agents act in a decentralized manner. Finally, 
physicists and applied mathematicians have tackled issue of complexity of webs with a 
large number of nodes. Their mathematical tools provide a systematic way of 
understanding the pattern of giant components in networks and give a neat picture of 
some of the relevant characteristics of these networks for applied works in other 
disparate areas such as, for example, medicine or criminology.
28 
We hope and expect that an increasing effort will be devoted in the coming years to 
build stronger connections between the different approaches. This can only enrich our 
view and understanding of social networks. It is only through this knowledge that we 




                                                      
28 A recent paper by König, Tessone and Zenou (2009) combine the applied-mathematic and economic tools to tackle 
the issue of dynamic network formation with strategic interactions. Indeed, they combine the network game 
introduced by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) where the Nash equilibrium action of each agent is 
proportional to his/her Bonacich centrality (see Section 4.1) with an endogenous network formation process where 
links are formed and severed on the basis of agents’ centrality, reflecting strategic interactions between agents. A 
remarkable feature of their dynamic network formation process is that, at each period of time, the network is a nested 
split graph, a graph that has very nice mathematical properties. They show that there exists a unique stationary 
network (which is a nested split graph) whose topological properties completely match features exhibited by real-
world networks (that is, small world properties, i.e., high clustering and low diameter, and power low distribution).   27
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